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Plaintiffs and Appellants Charles F. Hale and Beverly I. Hale ("Hales"), by 
counsel, submit the following reply brief in the above-referenced appeal. 
INTRODUCTION 
The heart of the parties5 dispute in this matter was purely arithmetical: the proper 
accounting for costs and payments in connection with the construction of two homes built 
as part of the unified construction project on Lots 45 and 4o, Triple Crown Estates, in 
South Jordan, Utah. The Consolidated Brief of Defendants and Appellees Big H 
Construction, Inc. and Dwayne Horsley ("Consol. Brief) tries mightily to suspend the 
trial court's ruling from credibility issues, invoking gratuitous language from the court's 
Findings and Conclusions (R. 2105-2162, prepared by Defendants5 counsel); by so doing, 
Defendants seek to frame legal errors as factual, in hopes that this Court will simply 
discard them. But their arguments are a smokescreen, intended to obscure the fact that 
the trial court adopted an untenable, hybridized financial analysis which (1) ignored one-
half of the balance sheet (specifically, the total amounts paid), and (2) permitted 
Defendants to recover for items that cannot, as a matter of law, be considered "costs." 
This case must be remanded with instructions to take the costs, deduct the duplicates and 
mistaken invoices, deduct the overpayments and the underpayments, deduct the 
impermissible costs, deduct the warranty items, and then add the total payments. 
Defendants attempt to mask the trial court's fundamental accounting errors by 
claiming that the evidence somehow showed the "reasonableness" of the costs which they 
claimed. But the "reasonableness" of costs is meaningless without considering the total 
984230.1 
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payments. Costs in a cost-plus building contract should, as a matter of law, be shown by 
the actual expenditures, rather than mere estimations of value. And, as a matter of law, 
reasonable costs are only those that Defendants paid unless they overpaid an invoice, in 
which case it is only the invoiced amount. When Big H paid a subcontractor more than 
the subcontractor requested, that is not a reasonable costs as a matter of law, and when 
Big H underpaid an invoice, the full amount cannot be considered reasonable. 
Defendants also acknowledge that there are duplicate and mistaken invoices, but 
assert that only the builder's profit portion of those mistakes should be considered. 
However, that arithmetic repeats the accounting errors. These are invoices that were 
added to the "costs" twice and were designated as having been paid with the Hales' 
funds. Crediting only ten percent back to the Hales does not make them whole. 
Finally, Defendants attempt to characterize the overpayments and underpayments 
as an issue of fact, for which the Hales did not marshal the evidence. But, just last year, 
this Court made it clear that the definition of "costs" in a contract and whether such costs 
are reasonable is an issue of law, reviewed for correctness. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN ITS CALCULATION OF DAMAGES. 
The trial court's first error was its calculation of damages without considering total 
costs versus total payments.1 This was an error of law, not fact: 
Throughout the construction, Defendants were receiving funds directly from the Hales 
and through draws on the Hales' loans. See R. 2111, 2114-2115, 2118 (referring to the 
loans and the Hales' personal expenditures). 
2 
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[The defendant] argues that the trial court used an incorrect method to 
calculate damages arising from his inability to access the Wasatch pipeline 
prior to July 2005. 'Whether the district court applied the correct rule for 
measuring damages is a question of law that we review for correctness.' 
Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Reott, 2011 UT App. 152 at f 10, - P.3d --. 
In her Minute Entry, the trial court: recognized that Defendants' expert testified 
that "the builder's fee for Lot 45 should be the sum of $ 149,425." R. 1731 (Note that the 
mechanic's lien amount was $165,000.) Instead of using that figure, though, the court 
added together the costs indicated in Exhibits RR and SS, determining that the costs 
"totaled $2,740,649." Id. The court then multiplied that figure by ten percent and 
deducted a $100,000 builder's profit payment (R. 1732), concluding that Defendants 
were entitled to $174,000 for the builder's profit on Lot 45.2 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by Defendants' counsel, 
the damages were calculated by an entirely different method. First, the Findings accepted 
the determination of John Lipzinski, Hales' cost analysis expert, that Defendants' total 
costs were $2,414,843. Yet the Findings then set this figure aside, and consider only the 
invoices from Exh. RR (the Lot 45 costs), which total $1,721,000. This the trial court 
multiplied by ten percent, ruling that Defendants were entitled to $172,100 in builder's 
profit.3 Even setting aside the differences between the Minute Entry and the Findings of 
2
 R. 1731-1732. 
3
 R. 2119. Another portion of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, without 
explanation, states that Big H was entitled to a fee of $162,875. R. 2118. 
984230.1 
3 
09057.0002 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Fact and the peculiar reference in the Findings to a $162,875 fee,4 the numbers within the 
rulings are internally inconsistent. 
First, the trial court held that the total cost for both houses was $2,414,843, and the 
total cost for Lot 45 was $1,721,000. Deducting the Lot 45 costs from the total would 
leave a cost balance for Lot 46 of only $693,843; yet, in the Minute Entry, trial court 
ruled that the Hales paid $100,000 in builder's profit - more than $30,000 too much if it 
was applied only to the Lot 46 house. Even the addition of the Lot 46 land cost back into 
the equation (which would be improper as a matter of law - see Point III below) cannot 
explain the discrepancy. The trial court's finding that "the Hales have not paid any 
portion of the $172,100 fee owed to Big H as of early December 2004" (R. 2121 at f 38)5 
must be deemed error as a matter of law. 
Second, the Findings of Fact adopt the calculation of $2,414,843 as "the total 
costs" (R. 2119 \ 35) - yet if Appellee Big H's total invoiced costs from Exhibits RR and 
SS are added together, they claim $2,740,649.40 for costs on both projects. R. 1731. 
Neither the Findings nor the Minute Entry explain the $325,806.40 difference. Even if 
the land costs are removed from the totals in Exhibits RR and SS {see Point III below), 
there is still a variance of nearly $57,000. There is only one explanation: there were 
4R.2118. 
5
 Defendants assert that the Hales did not sufficiently marshal the evidence. This is both 
the incorrect standard of review, and factually incorrect. See Hales' Opening Brief 
pp. 21-24, 29-30, and 34-35. The lower court's analysis relied on figures in Exhibits RR 
and SS, which Defendant/Appellee Dwayne Horsley testified were a comprehensive 
accounting of the project (R. 2801 at 106-108), and that Defendants had been paid no 
builder's profit on Lot 45 (R. 2801 at 74). The remaining analysis was the trial court's 
own. 
4 
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duplicate invoices (as Defendants acknowledge - see Consol Brief dX 27-29; pp. 12-13 
below). 
The methodology to calculate damages is fundamentally flawed because it 
requires the assumption that the payments from. Hales' funds were equal to the costs 
accounted for in Exhibits RR and SS. However, the Findings of Fact themselves 
acknowledge that Defendants had not included all of the payments in its spreadsheets. 
R. 2118, Consol Brief 'at 14 % 7. The trial court's calculations erred as a matter of law 
because they did not consider the total costs against the total payments. 
In short, this case must be remanded with instructions to add the total costs, deduct 
the duplicates and mistaken invoices, deduct the overpayments and the underpayments, 
deduct the impermissible costs, deduct the warranty items, and then add the total 
payments. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DAMAGES FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND INCORRECT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. The Trial Court's Analysis Failed to Account Properly for Documented 
Payments Versus Documented Expenditures. 
As noted above, the trial court's cost analysis began with a finding, ostensibly 
based on the testimony of Mr. Lipzinski, that Appellee Big H Construction, Inc.'s final 
accountings (Exhibits RR and SS) were "consistent with each other - in other words, that 
every item for which the Hales were invoiced had a corresponding value that was 
incorporated in their Lot 45 home." (R. 2119 at \ 34.) Yet the lower court then 
disregarded unrefuted testimony concerning errors and duplications in those exhibits. 
5 
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1. Improper Analysis of Invoices 
First, the court's finding that Mr. Lipzinski accepted the accuracy of Exhibits RR 
and SS is not supported by the evidence; in fact, it is refuted his express testimony:6 
Q: Last foundational question on Exhibits 33 and 34. Did you discover 
errors in those documents? Just yes or no. 
A: Yes, sir, I did. 
Q: Did you also find that there were documents later discovered that 
were not included in those? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: So based on your review of the accounting work that you've now 
identified, did you form an opinion concerning the adequacy of Big H's job 
accounting? 
A: Yes, sir, we have. 
Q: And is that the opinion you stated earlier on? 
A: It is. 
Q: Okay. Do you feel that the accounting work was adequate for the 
purposes? 
A: No, I do not. 
R. 2801 at p. 158 1.23-p. 1591. 13. 
Second, the trial court's finding that Mr. Lipzinski concluded that "every item for 
which the Hales were invoiced had a corresponding value that was incorporated in their 
"[T]he Hales' expert, Mr. Lipzinski, did not testify that there were any inaccuracies in 
Big H's final accounting (Exhs. RR and SS)." R. 2118-19. As discussed in the opening 
brief, and in support of the marshalling requirement, it is true that Mr. Lipzinski did not 
testify regarding errors in RR and SS. But, Exh. D- RR and SS are identical to P-33 and 
34. 
6 
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Lot 45 Home" is also not supported by the evidence.7 To the contrary, Mr. Lipzinski's 
analysis made clear that $72,735.16 were completely unsupported, and therefore not 
properly includable in a cost-plus analysis under prevailing industry standards: 
Q. You then have a line item that says less unsupported costs, and it 
references Schedule 3. This appears to be a deduction of $72,73 5.16. 
Would you walk the court through why you have unsupported costs on 
Schedule 3, and what they represent? 
A. Okay. What Schedule 3 represents - it's actually unnecessary, 
unnecessary or mismanaged costs. It represents things that are charged to a 
wrong job number, or basically does not - was not charged to the Hale 
properties. It also represents unsupported invoice information that we were 
never able to glean that information out of any of the documents that we 
received. And what that does, just so that you know, is that we have added 
up that value that shows up there is actually added to the value on - the 
total value on Exhibit 2, and then just reduce back off just clarification 
purposes. But basically between Schedule 3 and Schedule 2, that 
represents all the invoices that we've received -
Q. So if the court were to compare --
A. Or information. 
Q. I'm sorry. If the court were to compare Schedule 2 and 3, it would 
find all of the unsupported cost items on Schedule 3 reflected as invoiced 
amounts on Schedule 2? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. But then backed out again? 
A. Right. 
(R. 2801 at p. 167,1. 23-169,1. 1.) Defendants made no attempt to offer rebuttal 
testimony that Mr. Lipzinski's deduction of unsupported costs was unwarranted. 
7
 In support of the marshalling requirement, Defendants' expert testified essentially that 
the Hales received more value than they paid. See Hales' Brief at 21-23. In addition, the 
trial court found that Big H had not been repaid approximately $52,000 in loans. R. 
2116. 
QZATM i 
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Defendant/Appellee Dwayne Horsley, through all of his trial testimony, did not address a 
single line item of Mr. Lipzinski's Schedule 3 in any way, claiming only that Exhibits RR 
and SS were comprehensive and that he did not detect any duplicates (R. 2801 at pp. 53, 
79-80 and 106-108). A deduction of $72,735.16 was mandated by law. 
Thus, even without the trial court's improper inclusion of the overpayments and 
underpayments (see subpoint B, below), improper inclusion of land costs in the 
calculation (see Point III, below), inclusion of duplicate invoices (see Point IIB 3 below), 
failure to credit a specific $30,000 builder's fee payment (see Point III, below), and 
improper exclusion of repair costs (see Point V, below), the trial court's analysis started 
with an erroneous assumption: the total payments could not be simply ignored because it 
is undisputed that Exhibits RR and SS do not reflect those totals. From the very outset, 
therefore, the trial court's analysis was flawed. 
2. Improper Application of Payments 
The trial court's analysis failed on the payments side of the ledger by omitting 
entirely the total of payments on the project. Once the court determined the total amount 
of invoices, and allocated $1,721 million of those invoices to Lot 45, it simply walked 
away from the undisputed analysis of actual payments received: $2,375,507.99 (R. 2803 
at 2-19). This number was arrived at by accounting for all payments actually made on 
the project (Schedule 9), less amounts paid by Big H directly (Schedule 8), plus amounts 
reimbursed to Big H by Hales (Schedule 9), plus fees paid by Big H (Schedule 9). Id. 
Again, Defendants offered no evidence to refute Mr. LipzinskVs figures in this 
regard. Other than $30,000 of the builder's fees identified by Hales as such (see 
8 
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Point III, below), Defendants appear to have accepted Mr. Lipzinski's figure in this 
regard. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Considering the Full Amount of the Payment 
Where Big H Overpaid Invoices and the Full Amount of the Invoice 
Where Big H Underpaid the Invoice. 
As part of his testimony at trial, Mr. Lipzinski deducted two categories of costs 
from Defendants' allowable claim: instances where Defendants' payment was less than 
the invoiced amount (in which case they were credited only with the paid amount), and 
instances where the payment amount exceeded the invoiced amount (in which case they 
were credited with the invoice amount) (R. 2803 at 2-19). 
Defendants' only counter to Hales' analysis of the underpayments and 
overpayments is that Hales did not marshal the evidence. The court's error here, though, 
was again one of law. Hales were charged for the full amount of the payment where Big 
H paid more than an invoice, and the foil amount of the invoice where Big H underpaid 
an invoice. The question for this court is whether such charges can correctly be 
considered reasonable costs within the meaning of the parties' cost-plus contract. This, 
again, is an issue of law. 
In Dale K. Barker Co., PC v. John K. Bushnell, 2010 UT App. 189, 237 P.3d 903 
at f^ 16, the court was called upon to interpret the meaning of the term "costs" in a 
contract. "'The trial court's interpretation of the meaning of 'costs' and 'fees' in the 
contract is a question of law.'" Id. (quoting Kraatz v. Heritage Imps., 2003 UT App. 201, 
Tf 24, 71 P.3d 188). "Although the contract referred to 'all costs,' costs, like attorney fees, 
must be reasonable." Id. And, in that case, the Court of Appeals specifically instructed 
9 
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the trial court not to consider certain items that were duplicative and thereby deemed 
unreasonable. Id. at f 18. In their Opening Brief, Hales presented clear authority that 
such charges are unreasonable as a matter of law and cannot be considered "costs" for a 
cost plus contract. Opening Brief at 30-31. As such, the trial court erred in including 
them in the damages calculation.8 
1. Excluding the Overpayments and Underpayments (Schedule 1) 
Does Not Result in a "Double Dip." 
As drafted by Defendants' counsel, the trial court's Findings concluded that Mr. 
Lipzinski's Schedule 11 treatment of underpayments and overpayments "constitutes an 
improper double counting (double dip)." (R. 2127). The court's conclusion, though, is 
incorrect as a matter of law. Mr. Lipzinski's Schedule 2 (as found by the trial court itself 
- R. 2119) constitutes a comprehensive list of all invoices in connection with the project. 
Schedule 9, in turn, itemizes all payments made by or on behalf of Hales. R. 2127. 
Schedule 11 does not duplicate either of these Schedules; it simply deducts the net 
amounts by which invoices were discounted (the discount to be credited to Hales) or by 
which invoices were overpaid (in which case the amount of overpayment was likewise 
credited to Hales). Only the amounts of overpayment or underpayment are accounted for 
in Schedule 11 - not the entire amount of the invoices or payments. Yet Hales are 
credited for the full amount of payments, whether made to (or on behalf of) Defendants 
on the project, or whether allocated elsewhere. Similarly, Hales were credited for the 
discounts realized against invoices separately listed in Schedule 2, but only for the 
R. 21261 50 b,cii . 
10 
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amount of the discounts themselves, under Schedule 11. This was clearly explained 
during cross-examination (see R. 2802 at pp. 44-47); again, Defendants offered no 
analysis refuting that fact. 
2. Overpayments and Underpayments Should Not Be "Netted Out" 
as a Matter of Law. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law concluded that the underpayments 
and overpayments uat the very least, should be netted out against each other." R. 2128. 
This again is conceptually erroneous. For example, if Big H was invoiced $100, but used 
the Hales' loan funds to pay $150, and if, in another instance, Big H was invoiced $100, 
but negotiated with the subcontractor and paid only $50 of the Hales5 fund. Under the 
trial court's analysis, there should be no adjustment to the overall costs or payments 
because these items - the +$50 and the -$50 payments would "cancel out." In reality, 
Hales should not have had to pay the extra $50 - since the subcontractor did not charge it, 
Hales cannot legally be said to have incurred it. By the same token, Big H should not 
keep the $50 that it did not pay to the second subcontractor. That amount cannot be 
considered reasonable as a matter of law if Big H did not deem it worthy of payment. 
It is noteworthy, in this regard, that Defendants' own expert confirmed the 
propriety of this analysis. On cross-examination, Defendants' expert, Robert Nielson, 
was asked concerning whether a deduction for discounted payments over invoiced 
amounts was appropriate in a cost-plus contract analysis, and confirmed it expressly: 
Q: Would it be fair to say that if on any of the invoices in the binder 
you reviewed Big H actually paid less than the face invoice amount, it 
should be what Big H paid not the invoice amount that should be the basis 
of the builder's fee? 
11 
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A: Unless they have a contractual arrangement that allows them to 
benefit from discounts that they can get, yes. 
Q: That would be a correct assessment, wouldn't it? Because actual cost 
is actual cost, not invoice cost, but paid cost? 
A: Yes. 
R. 2803 at p. 1271. 12-p. 128 1. 2. 
3. The Full Value of the Duplicates and Mistaken Invoices Must be 
Considered. 
Defendants concede that there are duplicate and mistaken invoices, but attempt to 
minimize the effect of the duplicates by pseudo-accounting which again does not 
properly credit Hales' payments. See Consol. Brief at 28-29. Defendants concede that 
the CJ Heating invoice is a duplicate, and that Hales should be given a credit for it. Id. at 
29. But, the full amount of the duplicate ($17,985) must be deducted from the analysis to 
properly credit the Hales for their payment, not just the ten percent builder's profit. 
Defendants contend that the RT Custom Cabinets invoices are duplicative of only 
$1,264. Yet their own spreadsheet in Exhibit SS at page 4 shows: 
1 45 
^.«.»^.«w, .„*. 
R/r Custom Cabinets 
il.T Custom Cabinets 
R.T Custom Cabinets 
R.T Custom Cabinets 
R.T Custom Cabinets 
R.T Custom Cabinets 
R.T Custom Cabinets 
. . . V . U O U U . 
Cabinets 
Cabinets 
Cabinets 
Cabinets 
Conntcnops 
Payment 
Payment 
uciinir*~*- tvi u m o \„,i trfA-Jvtrt r , c f - u 
!ny#10M 
InvSTO?! 
inv#J072 
Down Payment 
Inv^IOI) 
CH22114913 Beehive £21,000.00 
41 rymy.jv 
$21,000.00 
$420.00 
£360.00 
51936.00 
. $21,000.00 
1-0- j 
-0-
^0-
-0-
'0-
Plainly, Big H entered Invoice #1011 twice, and the duplication was included in 
the calculations. In addition, Big H counted a payment of $19,736 as a cost. The trial 
court clearly erred in its calculation here. Defendants7 arguments regarding the down 
payment are mistaken. The document shows that it was a payment for Lot 46. See 
Exh SS at Tab 45, attached in part at Exhibit 1. 
12 
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The Hales must also be credited for $60,000 from Stroud Invoice No. 4601. The 
Stroud invoice is only for $60,000. Exh. SS at 24. Some handwritten notes makes 
reference to $120,000, and Big H's spreadsheets charged the Hales $120,000 for the 
invoice. Without explanation, Defendants claim that is "simply $45.90 more than the 
actual total." Consol Brief at 29. There is no finding that justifies the increase from 
$60,000 to $120,000. The court clearly erred in considering the $120,000, and the Hales 
must be given credit for their full payment. 
In all, $118,721 in duplications appear from the face of the very documents 
adopted by the trial court, and need to be deducted from a proper costs-vs-payments 
analysis. 
4. Overpayments Were Properly Deducted. 
Defendants' final claim, that Hales' overpayments were improperly deducted from 
Hales5 overpayment amount, is unclear. Apparently, Defendants believe that 
Mr. Lipzinski's accounting here results in deduction of $80,347.88, whereas only a tenth 
of that figure should have been deducted. If Defendants' invitation is accepted, though, 
and overpayments are deducted from the Adjusted Costs of the Work to reach the actual 
cost on which Defendants' builder's profit is calculated, the amount of overpayment is 
increased, not decreased. In either event, the trial court's disregard of overpayments 
entirely constitutes clear and reversible error as a point of law. 
QQA^ICi 1 
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C. The Trial Court Improperly Deferred to "Reasonable Costs" in Deference 
to Actual Accounting Figures. 
Having failed to rebut the validity of Hales' actual job cost accounting, 
Defendants fell back on (and the trial court adopted) the arguments that: 
Mr. Lipzinski found no evidence that any billed cost was excessive, 
unreasonable or above-market;... that Mr. Nielson confirmed the 
reasonableness of the costs through his two (change order and comparable 
price per square foot) analysis; and . . . the total amount of costs for the 
Lot 45 home is close to its appraised fair market value. 
R. 2120 at f 37. The trial court's reasoning here, though, disregards the superior 
accuracy of an actual cost analysis over "value received/5 and erroneously attributes an 
after-the-fact real estate appraisal as probative of actual costs incurred on the project. 
Neither approach is viable or tenable. 
1. Actual Cost Versus Reasonable Value 
All experts presenting evidence to the court agreed on one fundamental 
proposition: The most reliable and valid measure of a builder's charge under a cost-plus 
contract is the actual and reasonable costs incurred on the job. Mr. Lipzinski's testimony 
was clear and unequivocal in this regard (see R. 2801 at p. 138); Mr. Nielson, similarly, 
openly acknowledged that actual costs should be relied upon where they are available: 
Q: But I believe you testified in your deposition that neither of these 
methods is anywhere near as reliable as actual invoices; isn't that correct? 
A: I would still - yes, I would still say t ha t . . . . 
Q: And wouldn't be even better to look at actual invoices against actual 
payments to determine what actual costs were? 
A: Yes. Easier said than done, but yes. 
R. 2803 at p. 1341. 21-p. 135 1. 12. 
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Defendants, though, apparently believe that this is irrelevant. They rely heavily 
and repeatedly on the decision of Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2009 Utah 
81, 222 P.3d 1165, for the proposition that, under Utah law, both Defendants and the trial 
court were entitled to disregard actual and valid cost analysis in favor of "reasonable 
cost" testimony (Consol. Brief at pp. 2, 4, 19, 20, and 25). Thus, even though Hales cited 
the Court to numerous cases from around the country and a well-regarded treatise which 
all state that Defendants should have proven the reasonableness of expenditures through 
actual costs and payments, Defendants assert that the Traco Steel Erectors holding makes 
evidence of record, showing actual costs and payments, either optional or irrelevant. 
However, Defendants err in their interpretation of and reliance on Traco. 
Traco dealt with a unique situation not present before this Court. In that case, a 
steel erection subcontractor entered into two fixed price subcontracts with a general 
contractor for the performance of steel erection work on two state college projects. The 
subcontractor then abandoned the projects, and claimed additional payment. The general 
contractor counterclaimed for its costs incurred in completion. The trial court accepted 
the general contractor's damages evidence in the form of average cost data from RS 
Means Building Construction Cost Data - which the general contractor testified, without 
objection, reflected actual costs - and testimony on average hourly rates of its employees 
(2009 UT 81 at f 1). The subcontractor offered no actual cost evidence, having failed to 
subpoena it timely. 
Without marshaling evidence (Id at ^[3), the subcontractor challenged the 
adequacy of the evidence supporting the trial court's damages award. The Court of 
15 
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Appeals affirmed, and the Utah Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals on certiorari. 
Concerning the sufficiency of evidence supporting a damages award, the Utah Supreme 
Court began by observing that: 
As a general matter, "the desired objective is to evaluate any loss suffered 
by the most direct, practical and accurate method that can be employed" 
Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 22 Utah 2d 49, 448 P.2d 709, 711 (1968). 
Id. at <| 8 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court concluded that, given the lack of 
marshaled evidence concerning more reliable bases for the trial court's award, the sole 
question before it was whether, standing alone, the evidence derived from RS Means and 
testimony concerning average wages was legally sufficient. The court concluded that it 
was: 
In our view, the record leaves no room to doubt that reasonable minds 
might believe from the preponderance of the evidence that the damages 
presented by Comtrol through time cards, the RS Means average, and the 
testimony were actually suffered. 
. . . Had Traco timely subpoenaed Comtrol's payroll records, it is possible 
that such payroll records may have contradicted the evidence presented by 
Comtrol. Unfortunately, Traco failed to timely subpoena the payroll 
records and presented no other evidence, besides conflicting testimony and 
deposition exhibits, that the hourly rated $50.68 did not reflect the actual 
cost incurred for the labor and machinery required to complete Traco's 
work. 
Id. at \ 26. In short, the Traco decision supports Hales' contention that actual costs 
incurred - not estimates or values - are the proper measure of damages. Where evidence 
ofactual cost, and of actual payments is not only presented but undisputed, the Traco 
holding does not justify throwing out the whole in favor of "reasonableness." 
16 
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Also, Traco did allow evidence of averages to prove damages, but only where 
there is also evidence that the averages accurately account for the project. Id. at fflf 25, 
26. The testimony stated that the average "actually reflected the costs incurred," and 
plaintiff did not present contradictory evidence, arguing unsuccessfully that the evidence 
was insufficient on its face. In this case, by contrast, Defendants failed as a matter of law 
to provide a full and adequate accounting, as required by Traco. Instead, Defendants 
presented two admittedly incomplete and plainly duplicative packets of invoices, and 
then called an expert who testified that, in his opinion, the documented cost of the Lot 45 
house was "reasonable" because in his view the Hales received more value than the 
tabulated costs.9 But, it is undisputed that Big H did not present the total payments.10 
Big H's expert did not attempt to determine how much was owed and to whom by 
offsetting the actual costs against the actual payments; he did not consider one of the two 
houses at all.11 
Note, moreover, that in Traco, the court stated, "We are aware of no authority . . . 
that restricts evidence that may be used to prove contract damages to primary 
documentation of actual cash outlays to workers or suppliers, or that failure to do so 
results in a failure to present a prima facie case of damages." Id. at f 23. In fact, there is 
a volume of authority holding that, in the context of cost-plus contracts, what may be 
considered a "cost," and whether it was reasonable, can only be proved by actual invoices 
9
 R. 1731, R. 2120, R. 1322, R. 2803 at 92-96. 
l0Consol. BriefatU^l. 
11
 R. 2803 at 124. 
oe/n^n i 
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and payment records. Defendants seem to assert that Traco cannot be harmonized with 
those cases, and that they should therefore simply be ignored. Traco, though, must be 
read together with such other authority. With such a reading, Traco does not contradict 
nationwide authority more directly on point with the facts of this case. The only proper 
reading of Traco, giving due consideration to the national consensus, is that the evidence 
before the court therein - in the absence of better evidence - was sufficient to prove 
actual costs incurred. 
Finally, Traco is also distinguishable as not dealing with a cost-plus contract with 
a non-builder. The parties in Traco were industry insiders adjusting payments under a 
fixed-price contract. Hales' cited case law involved individual homeowners versus 
contractors. See, e.g, Treen Const, Inc. v. Reasonover, 30 So.3d 933, 936 (La. App. 
2009); Burdette v. Drushell, 837 So.2d 54, 59 (La. App. 2002); Freeman & Co. v. Bolt, 
968 P.2d 247, 254 (Idaho App. 1998); Nolop v. Spettel, 64 N.W.2d 859, 863-864 (Wis. 
1954); Forrest Const. Co., LLC v. Laughlin, 337 S.W.3d 211, *8, 2009 WL 4723365 
(Term. App.). This distinction is pivotal in that cost-plus contracts give significant 
discretion to the contractor. As such, contractors dealing with non-industry owners 
Treen Const, Inc. v. Reasonover, 30 So. 3d 933, 936 (La. App. 2009); Burdette v. 
Drushell, 837 So. 2d 54, 59 (La. App. 2002); Freeman & Co. v. Bolt, 968 P.2d 247, 254 
(Idaho App. 1998); Arc Elec. Co., Inc. v. Esslinger-Lefler, Inc., 591 P.2d 989, 992 (Ariz. 
App. 1979); Union Bldg. Corp. v. J&JBldg. & Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 578 
S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Nolop v. Spettel, 64 N.W.2d 859, 863-864 (Wis. 
1954); JBR Contractors, Inc. v.E&W, LLC, 2010 WL 802076, 991 A.2d 18 (unpub.); 
Forrest Const Co., LLC v. Laughlin, 337 S.W.3d 211, *8, 2009 WL 4723365 (Term. 
App.); 17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 495. 
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should be viewed as quasi-fiduciaries; and, they must produce an accounting that is more 
than a best guess. 
2. Appraisal Testimony 
If estimates of building value were inadequate to demonstrate costs, fair market 
value of the home as built, as estimated by a real estate appraisal performed after 
construction was completed, was clearly inadequate in the face of contradictory actual 
cost evidence, including (as it must) changes in the real estate market in the region. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT'S INCLUSION OF LAND COSTS 
IN ITS ANALYSIS CONSTITUTED AN 
IMPERMISSIBLE AWARD OF A REAL ESTATE 
COMMISSION TO DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS. 
As a matter of law, Defendants cainnot be awarded a ten percent profit on the 
cost of the land. It is undisputed that the parties' contracts do not refer to or authorize 
such a profit.14 
Defendants attempt a semantic avoidance of the Statute of Frauds15 by arguing that 
a ten percent commission on the lots without any writing is valid because the lot was a 
Defendants contend that the Hales failed to marshal the evidence on this issue; 
however, the issue centers on the interpretation and application of statutes and the legal 
definition of "costs," not on the sufficiency of the evidence. Even if every disputed fact 
regarding the land is found in Defendants' favor, Defendants are still not entitled to 
recover a profit on the land because there is not written contract supporting the profit and 
Defendants are not authorized under the Real Estate Licensing and Practices Act. As 
such, marshalling of evidence cannot be required. See Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Reott, 
2011 UT App. 152, Tf 2, - P.3d - (stating that the application of the Statute of Frauds is 
reviewed for correctness). 
14
 None of the four contracts contain a provision authorizing a commission on the land or 
relating to whether the land can be included as a "cost" for purposes of the builder's 
profit Exhs. P-5, 6, 7, 8. The same is true of the addenda. Exhs. P-9, 10, 11. 
15
 Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1, et seq. 
Q&mO 1 
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"cost." But the Statute of Frauds is broad in its sweep. It requires that "every agreement 
authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation" be in writing "signed by the party to be charged with the agreement." 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(5) (2003).16 "Compensation" means "something given or 
1 7 
received as an equivalent for services, debt, loss, injury, suffering, etc." or "payment, 
remuneration." The Statute of Frauds also provides: 
No estate or interest in real property ..., nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or 
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the 
party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2003). Under the plain reading of the statute, whether the 
claim is called a profit on a cost or a commission, Defendants cannot recover any fee 
relating to the price of the lots. 
The Real Estate Licensing and Practices Act ("the Licensing Act")19 also forbids 
Defendants from claiming a profit on the lots. It is undisputed that Defendants are not 
authorized real estate brokers or agents. Defendants claim that the land was "acquired 
with the professional assistance of David Horsley, a licensed real estate agent acting for 
The Statute of Frauds was amended in 2004, but it did not change the substance of this 
subsection. 
17
 www.dictionary.com. 
Miriam Webster Dictionary available at www.m-w.com. 
19
 Utah Code Ann. § 61-2f-201, etseq. (2003). 
20
 There is no finding indicating that either Defendant is so licensed. See R. 1722-34, 
2105-62. Defendants do not assert that they were so licensed at the time of the events in 
question or at any time. See Consol Brief. 
20 
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Big H." However, the Licensing Act does not permit an unlicensed third-party to claim a 
real estate commission. 
No person may bring or maintain am action in any court of this state for the 
recovery of a commission, fee or compensation for any act done or sendee 
rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to other than licensed 
principal brokers, unless the person was duly licensed as a principal broker 
at the time of the doing of the act or rendering the service. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2f-409 (2003). Defendants are the parties seeking to "bring or 
maintain an action in any court of this state for the recovery of a commission, fee or 
compensation;" yet, they are "other than licensed principal brokers." A simple reading of 
the plain language of the Licensing Act makes it clear that Defendants cannot claim a 
commission on the cost of the lots. 
In response to Plaintiffs argument that the Mechanic's Lien Act precludes land 
costs from being included, Defendants argue that they may recover under the Mechanic's { 
Lien Act because they "rendered service[s]" in relation to the lots. Consol Brief at 28 
n.20. Even if the contradictions in Defendants' semantics were overlooked, their 
assertions fail as a matter of law. The Licensing Act prohibits Defendants from 
recovering compensation for rendering services related to the purchase of lots, and there 
is no other provision in the Mechanic's Lien Act that would permit Defendants such a 
recovery. 
Defendants also contend that the Hales waived these statutory arguments by not < 
asserting them as an affirmative defense at the start of the case. But Defendants' 
984230.1 
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71 
counterclaim does not indicate that Defendants claimed a profit on the sale of the land. 
Hales cannot be expected to divine Defendants' mathematics at the pleadings stage -
indeed, Hales' Complaint sought an accounting because they did not know the basis of 
Defendants' claims. In any event, Hales' Complaint expressly challenged whether 
77 
Defendants' asserted costs were "legitimate and reasonable," and their Counterclaim 
Answer incorporated their Complaint. The Hales' Complaint also specifically puts the 
Mechanic's Lien Act at issue, alleging the invalidity of the lien, slander of title on the 
basis of the claimed Mechanic's Lien, and abuse of the lien right. The issues, 
moreover, were clearly presented to the court at trial (see Rule 15(b), Utah R. Civ. P.).24 
POINT IV. JAMES HORSLEY HAD ACTUAL AND APPARENT 
AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT THE $30,000 PAYMENT, 
AND HALES PROPERLY MARSHALED THE 
EVIDENCE. 
Rather than challenging the Hales legal arguments with respect to James Horsley, 
Defendants assert only that the Hales failed to marshal the evidence; however, the Hales 
properly marshaled the evidence as to the findings that they challenge. Defendants assert 
that Hales omitted: "1 . The Hales decided to make the check payable to James, not Big 
H." Consol Brief dX 34. But, the Hales' Brief says, "the Hales wrote a check to James 
Horsley." Hales' Brief at 37. Defendants argue that the Hales did not state, "2. James 
was not a shareholder, officer or director of Big H." Consol. Brief at 34. Yet, the brief 
states, "James testified that he was not ever an officer, director or shareholder in Big H." 
21
 R. 57-60. 
22
 R. 1-34. 
23Id 
24
 R. 1863-67,76. 
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Hales' Brief at 38. Defendants assert that the Hales did not state, "3. There is no 
evidence that James appears on any Big H records maintained by the Utah Division of 
Corporations." Consol Brief at 34. But, the Hales cited this verbatim. Hales9 Brief'at 
37. Defendants assert that the Hales failed to state: "4. At the time James received the 
$30,000 check, the Hales knew that their failure to pay the agreed-upon ten percent fee to 
Big H had created enormous tensions between James and Dwayne (Horsley), leading to 
numerous arguments between them." Consol Brief at 34. However, the Hales did state, 
"Mr. Hale's testimony could be read to indicate that he knew James was not receiving 
draws from Big H, and that James could not induce Dwayne to pay him. In addition, 
Mr. Hale testified that he knew that James and Dwayne were 'estranged5 at the time that 
he paid James the $30,000." Hales' Brief at 38, 40 n.57. Also, "the Hales were aware 
that there were 'enormous tensions' between Dwayne and James." Id. at 42. Next, 
Defendants assert that the Hales' brief fails to acknowledge that "The Hales well knew 
that James wanted the check to pursue a personal investment opportunity in a start-up 
mortgage company." Consol Brief at 34. But, the Hales acknowledged this finding 
verbatim. Hales' Brief at 42. Defendants also argue that the Hales did not marshal: 
"6. The Hales failed to designate Big H as a joint payee on the check." Consol Brief at 
34. Yet, the Hales stated, "the Hales wrote a check to James Horsley." Hales' Brief at 37 
(emphasis added). Defendants also argue that the Hales did not marshal evidence in 
support of the trial court's finding at R. 2123 f 39 that it was "otherwise unreasonable" 
for the Hales to have expected James to apply the payment to Big H. However, the Hales 
did marshal the evidence with respect to the portions of that conclusion that they 
23 
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challenged, and the unchallenged portions do not require marshalling. "A party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). It goes without saying that fact findings 
that are not challenged do not need to be marshaled. In short, Hales challenged the trial 
court's conclusions at 39a and b that James did not have actual or apparent authority, and 
properly marshaled the evidence in support of those points. 
In addition, Defendants assert that the Hales did not marshal the evidence 
supporting the findings that, "Before they sued Big H, the Hales never informed Big H or 
Horsley of the existence of the payment, or of their position that it was supposed to be a 
credit to their account with Big H" and, "At the point the Hales issued the check to 
James, they were in an adversarial relationship with Big H, making it incumbent upon 
them to clearly inform Big H of the payment to assure that it was aware of it." To the 
extent that there is a dispute as to whether James was a part of "Big H," the Hales 
properly marshaled any evidence that would support a conclusion that he was not. Hales' 
Brief at 37-38, 40 n.58, 41 (acknowledging the evidence that James was not an officer, 
director or shareholder in Big H; that James does not appear in the corporate records; that 
there was some testimony that James was not a employee of Big H; and that the Hales 
The Hales did not expressly or impliedly challenge portions of the court's findings that 
support this conclusion. Specifically, "7. The Hales failed to have James (or Big H) sign 
a restrictive endorsement" and "The Hales, in their entire history of their profitable 
family business, had never before issued to an individual (such as James) a check 
supposedly intended for a business entity creditor (such as Big H). . . . Mrs. Hale 
testified at trial [that] when she paid accounts on behalf of the family business (BC), she 
was always careful to assure that invoices were paid to the correct payee, since she knew 
it is difficult to recover the payment if it is directed to the wrong creditor.55 
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knew that James was subordinate to Dwayne). The Hales do not challenge the remainder 
of these findings, and therefore had no duty to marshal the evidence supporting them. 
The Hales therefore request that this Court consider the substance of their legal argument, 
points which the Defendants entirely ignore. 
POINT V. ALL OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY THIS APPEAL ARE 
ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED IN HALES' OPENING 
BRIEF. 
Hales rely on their opening brief for the remaining issues of warranty repair costs 
and Defendants' wrongful liening of Hales' properly. For the reasons set out therein, the 
trial court should have included the only competent evidence concerning the cost of 
repairs to Defendants5 defective workmanship on the houses (which both experts agreed 
was necessary); further, Defendants should answer for having asserted a lien in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25. 
DATED this 5th day of July, 2011. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Kathleen E. McDonald 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Hales' Reply Brief was mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following this 
5th day of July, 2011: 
John T. Anderson 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for 
Big H Construction, Inc. 
Bradley L. Tilt 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2323 
Attorneys for 
CitiMortgage, Inc. 
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^aMMWmas 
^iijiiirmiti 
Invoice 
i 
DATE 
J./29/2004 
INVOICE* 
1011 
BILL T O 
Hale, Chuck 
(TifEani & Jr/s Home) 
Lot $46 11136 S Sir Barton Ln 
So Jordan, UT 
DESCRIPTION 
Upstair? Kitchen tops (Cambria Park Gate) 
Add for Ogee edge 
Laundry room tops with under mounted sink 
Add for Ogee edge 
Master bath - 3 tops, phistadius top in water closet (Travertine) 
Add for Ogee edge 
Basement Kitchen tops with bade splash & under mounting of sink 
Add for ogee edge 
Basement bath room (Travertine) 
Add for Ogee edge 
Powder room tatb 
Add for Ogee edge 
Main Bathroom -with under mounted sink (Travertine) 
Add for Ogee edge 
QTY UNIT/RATE 
6,048.00 
1,050.00 
2,047.00 
288.00 
1.730.00 
210.00 
4,620.00 
1.312.00 
819.00 
153.00 
655.00 
158.00 
789.00 
121.00 
AMOUNT 
Total 
6,048.00 
1.050.00 
2t047.00 
288.00 
2.730.00 
210.00 
4;620.00 
1312,00 
8)9.00 
153.00 
655.00 
158.00 
789.00 
121.00 
$21,000.00 
BIG H 0454 
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Mmmfnmmm 
Ta 
(Ti&w Air/3 Home) 
Lot #46 11136 S. Sir Bate* LA 
g a t o t a * ITT 
^ . J J P I O O r . KJI 
Statement 
AMOUNT DOE 
DATE 
4/9/20O4 
Sl,m«T 
DATE 
01/28/2004 
01/29/2004 
&mnm 
owmm 
TRANSACTION 
BxHaax fbrwasd 
mv#jon 
JNVI1071 
INVj5fl072 
AMOUNT |1I 
BALANCE ] 
0.00 ; 
.21,000.00 I 
21,420.00 i 
.21,780,00 • 
11 
AMOUNT DUE $21,780.00 1 
' 
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10/30/2006 ION 15:29 FAI 8015610099 RT Custom Cabinetry inc, 
•» iranster 
1027/033 
WH-5W3535 Fax 801-561-0099 
BILLTO 
Hale, Chufles & Beverly 
10864 So. 2420 W. 
So.JosJaii, UT 84095 
Invoice 
i DATE 
j 4/8/2004 
INVOICED 
1072 
DESCRIPTION 
Valances aioimd mirror (remake) for Jr, s IKWSC 1 
! Electrical wtak in bath forJr.sliousc 
I Electrical work in island for Jr. s honse 
Remake sink support for Jr, s house 
XTTY UNIT/RATE 
175.00 
15-00 
130.00 
40.00 
AMOUNT j 
175.00 
15.00 
130.00 
40.00 
Total $360.00 
DUE UPON (X5MPIBTION OF WORK/ JOB. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mil tiifismi D»te:JLj^L_2ott. 
PROPOSAL AND CONTRACT AGREEMENT 
We (R.T. Custom Cabinetry inc.) propose to provide all necessary materials and labor to manufacture and or install all 
cabinetry and or countertops in a substantial workmanlike order as according to trade standards or customer satisfaction for: 
4-
-I , 
Work to be performed at: 
c 
^ —=^_ Lpr^46 ~ 1115b 5. &( (km* C 
_ As covered in the specifications and or drawings provided, for the s^ m of: $ \Y\ \. > <3J 
JDollars. To be paid under 
the terms tojpliow: 50% deposit upon ^ening of this apeement, balance dueuprjn^nipletion of services covered herein. 
£D0]i^ ft !%•£-
We are maintaimifig a six to eight week production lead-time. New jobs are added to the production schedule only after a contract, deposit, 
and complete floor plan - including but not limited to; decision on all options, choices, appliance specifications, final measuremtaits and or any 
information pertinent to the manufacturing and or installation of the proposed project. When the aforementioned items and information are 
provided and complete, you will be informed in writing of the next available completion/installation date. We ask you, the consumer to choose 
from the available completion and or installation dates and guarantee readiness of the proposed job-site. 
We will manufacture to achieve the scheduled date and hereby offer a $30 per day discount if delivery and installation of the said project 
fells behind schedule. (Based on a four day work week) Jn the event job she readiness falls behind the scheduled delivery/installation date, your 
cabinetry and or produced project shall be warehoused at an additional cost to you of $30 per day. (Based on a four day work week) In the event 
the project need be warehoused for more than eight days (Based on a four day work week) full and total amount of this agreement, less 
installation price, shall be invoiced and become due and payable. 
Delivery/installation of such postponed projects shall be rescheduled at our availability and negotiated upon job-site readiness. We operate 
> a tight schedule, but can typically reschedule installs within ten working days. ([Based on a four day work week) 
No plumbing, electrical, flooring, decorating or other construction work shall be performed unless specified in the drawings and or 
specifications provided and covered herein. (Openings for appliances and or sinks shall be built or cut to the specifications provided by you, the 
consumer, or your representative (appliance or sink provider) as per cutout spedfications. In the event incorrect information is provided, a 
service charge and or change order may be necessary to modify or rebuild the project to current altered specifications provided. 
We shall deliver and install this project as per this agreement as carefully and proficiently as possible. We shall not assume or be held liable 
for any job-site damage to flooring, walls, ceilings etc. unless such damage is negligent and careless on our behalf It is advised that finished 
flooring and moldings be installed after installation of cabinetry to avoid any damage that may result in standard and typical installation 
procedures. On remodels we ask that the room be clear of appliances or objects that may hinder the placement and installation of isabinetry. 
It is specifically understood that all items manufactured by R.T. Custom Cabinetry inc., both in the shop and or on the job-site, will Temain 
the property of R.T. Custom Cabinetry inc. until 100% paid for in full. We retain the right upon breach of this agreement by the purchaser to sell 
those items in our possession. In effecting any resale on breach of this agreement by the purchaser, we shall be deemed to act in the capacity of 
agent for th&purchaser. The purchaser shall be liable for any net deficiency on resale. 
ID To- 3ml ^ 
A 5% discount shall be given if payment is received immediately upon installation/completion. In the event payment is not received within 
ten (10) calendar days, we reserve the right to charge interest in the amount of 2% per month, not to exceed 24% per year. At twenty (20) days 
past due, it is customary to file notice of intent to lien. In the event a collection agency or legal representation is necessary, yoti, the purchaser 
agree to reimburse us, R.T. Custom Cabinetry inc. for any reasonable amounts expended in order to collect 100% of the total contract balance. 
Deposit date: lQ/2^/ujCheck # 3JJ1 1 Submitted by: 1 W^X 
Amount of deposit: J Title: 
.—^jamm* ACCEPTANCE 
You (R/T. Cijstom^abinetry inc.) are hereby authorized to furnish all the materials and labor required to complete the work 
mentioned in the proposal and contract agreement above, for which I/we agree to pay the amounts mentioned in said proposal and 
\ccording to the terms thereof 
Acceptedbv:X Y j - , .-. L i WC*^Z^ Date: /£>/&f 2Qg> 3 
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invoice 
DATE 
1/29V2004 
INVOICE* 
ton 
BJLLTO 
Hate, Chock 
(Tiffittil&Jr^Homc) 
Lot #4£ l l 136 & Sk jBartoei Lo 
SaJatfan. OT 
DESCRIPTION 
1 Upstairs Kitchen tops (Cambria Park Gate) 
j Add fir Ogre edge 
1 Laundry room top* wiih tsider joomfaed sink 
1 Add far Ogee edge 
Mtotcr bath - 3 iop&pita radius top m water doact (Travertine) ' 
[Add far Ogee edge 
\B*KjmajtT?ndKtiU^miAhb^$fA*& & wider iriaxomgofwok 
1 Add far ogee edge 
Bajcmem bath room (Travertine) 
' Addfcr Ogee edge 
wderrooifl bafcb. 
._-dd for 0*cc edge , ; % 
Main Bathroon with imSer mounted sink (Travertine) 
AddfrrQgxe<tee 
QTY 
• 
UNF17RATE 
6,048.00 
1,050.00 
2,047.00 
218.00 
2,730.00 
210.00 
4*20.00 
1 1,312.00 
819.00 
153.00 
I 655.00 
158.00 
789-00 
121.00 
| — ' : 
AMOUNT 
6,0*8.00 
LO50.00 
2^047.00 
2884)0 
2,730.00 
210.00 
-4,620.00 
U 12.00 
819.00 
153.00 
655.00 
158.00 
789.00 
121.00 
T o t a l 521,000.00 
BCU 008 
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45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 J 
I Craftsmen Tile 
i Craftsmen Tile 
I Craftsmen Tile 
1 Craftsmen Tile 
1 R.T Custom Cabinets 
1 R.T Custom Cabinets 
1 R.T Custom Cabinets 
I R.T Custom Cabinets 
1 R.T Custom Cabinets 
1 R.T Custom Cabinets 
1 R.T Custom Cabinets 
CR Painting 
CR Painting 
CR Painting 
CR Painting 
CR Painting 
' CR Painting 
Sure Appliances 
Sure Appliances 
Tanner Glass 
Tanner Glass 
Garage Door Center 
Garage Door Center 
Capitol Rain Gutters 
Capital Rain Gutters 
Big H Construction 
Big H Construction 
Big H Construction 
Big H Construction 
Questar Gas 
Questar Gas 
Questar Gas 
Questar Gas 
City of South Jordan 
City of South Jordan 
City of South Jordan 
City of South Jordan 
Valley Ready Mix 
Utah Power 
Utah Power 
Utah Power 
Utah Power 
Bonnie Reynolds 
Sunline Landscaping 
Sunline Landscaping 
Sunline Landscaping 
Sunline Landscaping 
Sunline Landscaping 
Sunline Landscaping 
Sunline Landscaping | 
Sunline Landscaping 
Sunline Landscaping 
Sunline Landscaping 
Sunline Landscape 
CHS Construction 1 
CHS Construction 1 
Artisan Stairways 1 
Artisan Stairways 1 
Mark Campbell 1 
Mark Campbell 1 
Meitler Metal Works 
Old World Stone 
At Home Furnishings 1 
Valley Sand & Gravel 
Valley Sand & Gravel 
BMC West 
BMC West 
Water Essentials 
Diamond Rental | 
1 Tile/Medallions 
1 Tile labor 
1 Tile labor 
I Tile Labor 
1 Cabinets 
1 Cabinets 
1 Cabinets 
1 Cabinets 
| Countertops 
1 Payment 
1 Payment 
1 Painting 
1 Painting 
| Painting 
Payment 
Payment 
Payment 
Appliances 
Payment 
Door knobs 
Payment 
Garage doors 
Payment 
Rain gutters 
Payment 
Framing labor 
Framing labor 
Framing labor 
Finish labor j 
Service agreement 
Temp gas 
Payment 
Payment 
Water 
Water 
Water 
Water 
concrete 1 
Temp power 1 
Temp power | 
Temp power 1 
Temp Power 1 
Final clean 1 
Landscaping 1 
LandscapingAvtrfall/rock walls 1 
Payment 1 
Payment 1 
Payment 1 
Payment 1 
Payment 1 
Payment 1 
Payment 1 
Payment 1 
Hang Doors 1 
Payment 1 
Rails/payment 1 
Rails/payment 1 
Finish work 1 
Finish work 1 
Exterior rails 1 
Sinks 1 
Credenza 1 
Gravel 1 
Gravel 1 
Lumber for temp rail 1 
Stakes / Tapes 1 
Water purifier 1 
Heaters | 
T Payable to Arizona tile CH#20974 F.U.B 
None CH//20977 F.U.B 
None/ Big H 
Balance to date CH#23084 F.U.B 
lnv#1011 
lnv#1071 
lnv#1072 
Down Payment 
Inv#10Il 
CH#21149 J 3 Beehive $21,000.00 
Inv#336 
lnv#345 
CH#23074 F.U.B $17,000 
CH#3 J 54 Big H $10,000 
CH03342 Big H $17,000 
CH#23085 F.U.B $14,682.02 
Inv#3000479 
CH#3495 Big H $2,763.42 
lnv#615218 
CH#22207 F.U.B $3,662.00 
Inv#2l 
CH#23076 F.U.B $1,842.75 
CH#020110 F.U.B 
CH#018361 F.U.B 
CH#018511 F.U.B 
CH#21J 3331 Beehive $ 15,000.00 i 
CH#18220 F.U.B 
CH#23078 F.U.B 
Big H 
Big H 
CHtfOOOOl9529 F.U.B 
Big H 
BigH 
BigH 
lnv#53023CH#019074 F.U.B 
BigH 
CH#000020106 F.U.B 
CH#000019525 F.U.B 
CH#18216 F.U.B 
Hales 
Inv#900 $79,000 
Inv #502 $50,000 
CH#126 Hales $30,500 
CH#139 Hales $10,000 
CH#225 Hales $14,250 
CH#262 Hales $14,250 
OW3542 Hales $15,000 
CH#3557 Hales $15,000 
CH#2113236 Beehive C.U 
James 1 
Inv#l112 
CJW3237 BigH $1,494.00 
Inv#9182 
Cashiers check James Horsley $6,000.00 
Charged to lot 45 $1,168.00 
Charged to Lot 45 $8,976.00 
CH# 126 Hales 
Visa Tiffany Hale 1 
Visa Big H $935.00 Remainder Tiffany 
Inv#46410CH# 18221 F.U.B 
Inv#46437 CH# 18221 F.U.B $1,938.36 
BigH 
CH#18214 F.U.B 1 
Quote 30497 Hales 
CH#3269 Big H 
!
 $2,220.00 
$9,800.00 
$5,289.00 
$7,349.50 
$21,000.00 
$420.00 
$360.00 
$19,736.00 
$21,000.00 
$17,000.00 
$17,176.00 
$2,865.00 
$14,682.02 
_$2,763.42 
$3,662.00 
$1,842.75 
$18,500.00 
$14,300.00 
$10,000.00 
$15,000.00 
$116.86 
$420.29 
$30.64 
$29.92 
$26.68 
$56.45 
$2,505.10 
$19.97 
$55.69 
$22.45 
$86.62 
$2,360.00 
$10,000.00 
$1,494.00 
$6,000.00 
$8,197.50 
$1,211.25 
$2,805.71 
$620.41 
$1,317.95 
$385.60 
$101.78 
$5,496.25 
$417.87 
| -0-
-0-
-0-
- 0 - j 
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-Q-\ 
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
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